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ABSTRACT. Water rights are currently receiving increased attention from scholars and
policymakers due to the growing understanding that ill-defined water rights impair
efficient use. In South Africa, smallholder irrigation faces problems of low water use
efficiency and cost recovery of government investments. This study uses contingent
ranking to analyse the willingness to pay (WTP) of smallholder irrigators for changes
in the water rights system. The results indicate that smallholders are prepared to pay
considerably higher water prices if these are connected to improvements in the water
rights system. By segmenting the population it was also shown that the importance
attached to water rights dimensions varies in each segment. While lower institutional
trust and lower income levels lead to a lower WTP for transferability, experiencing water
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shortage increases this WTP. Such information is valuable in guiding policy makers in the
future design of water rights.
1. Introduction
Internationally there is growing understanding that water rights are
important and that a lack of effective water rights systems creates major
problems for the management of increasingly scarce water supplies
(Matthews, 2004; Bruns et al., 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya, 2005). This is
because, in general, ill-defined property rights limit the value people assign
to a resource (Randall, 1978; Ostrom, 2000; Heltberg, 2002; Linde-Rahr,
2008; Halsema and Withagen, 2008; Libecap, 2009). Ill-defined water rights
create high transaction costs (information search, negotiation, monitoring)
for making decisions over water use, which seriously impairs the efficient
use of water (Challen, 2000; Wichelns, 2004). This implies that if water
rights are better defined, people will be willing to pay higher prices for
water use because the transaction costs will be reduced (Herrera et al, 2004).
This makes it possible to use contingent valuation methods to evaluate
alternative water rights policy options (see for example Herrera et al., 2004
or Frija et al., 2008).
According to McCann et al. (2005), choice experiments are particularly
promising tools for such analysis because of their potential to separately
value different characteristics of a given situation. This study focuses
on smallholder irrigators in South Africa and uses contingent ranking
(CR), a form of choice experiment, to evaluate potential improvements
in the country’s water rights system. This study has policy relevance
as, since its introduction in 1998, South Africa’s water rights system has
been the subject of extensive criticism (see Louw and van Schalkwyk,
2002; Nieuwoudt, 2002; Perret, 2002; Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004;
Backeberg, 2006; Pott et al., 2009). Also smallholder irrigation schemes1
play a potentially important role in rural development. Improved water
rights can not only stimulate smallholders to use water more productively
and invest in water conserving technologies (Wichelns, 2004; Bruns, 2003,
2007; Brooks and Harris, 2008), but their resulting higher willingness to
pay (WTP) for water can also allow governments to improve cost recovery
(Ntengwe, 2004; Virjee and Gaskin, 2005). Both these aspects are of relevance
as the smallholder irrigation sector in South Africa is inefficient in its use of
water (Speelman et al., 2008a) and the level of cost recovery of government
investments is considered insufficient (Backeberg, 2006; Perret and Geyser,
2007).
A second aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of different
population characteristics on people’s WTP. This additional information
can help policy makers to better target their interventions, by improving
their knowledge about likely support among different types of farmers
1 Smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa are areas in the former homelands
or in other resource poor areas equipped for irrigation by the state or by previously
disadvantaged farmers and development agencies. The typical farmer usually has
around 1.5 ha of land, while the total size of the schemes can range from 5 to more
than 1,000 ha (Denison and Manona, 2009).
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for specific interventions. In this way the impact of the water right
improvements can be increased.
2. Methodology
This study developed a CR experiment to determine WTP for improvements
in the water rights system. CR is a survey-based technique for modelling
preferences for goods, where goods are described in terms of their
attributes and the level these take. Respondents are presented with various
descriptions of a good, differentiated by their attribute levels and asked to
rank the various alternatives. The technique originates from marketing and
transportation science but more recently choice models, of which CR is a
special form, have proven to be useful in valuing other multidimensional
interventions (Hanley et al., 2001, Bateman et al., 2006; Burton et al., 2007;
Kanyoka et al., 2008; Mondelaers et al., 2009; Do and Bennett, 2009). Like
other choice models, CR avoids an explicit elicitation of respondents’
willingness to pay. CR however provides more information than classical
choice models, because its rankings show more about the preferences of the
respondents (Holmes and Adamowicz, 2002).
There are some potential problems in using the method: these include
the complex nature of the statistical design, the selection of the appropriate
attributes and levels and the cognitive difficulties that participants may
experience when ranking choices (Hanley et al., 2001). Typically, the design
of a choice experiment involves three stages (Bennett and Adamowicz,
2001; Holmes and Adamowicz, 2002). Firstly, the problem has to be
characterised. Then the attributes and their levels should be chosen. Finally,
experimental design procedures are used to construct the ranking tasks that
will be presented to the respondents. The following paragraphs discuss the
implementation of these steps in this study.
2.1. Characterisation of the problem
The National Water Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) replaced the
previous system of water rights and entitlements, which was based on the
ownership of riparian land, with a new system of licences. These licenses
are administrative, valid for limited period and come under conditional
authorizations in case of using water (Nieuwoudt, 2002). Except for the
fundamental right of access to water for basic human needs, all other water
uses require a licence (Stein, 2005). This change must be seen in the context of
the efforts made by the new democratic government since 1994 to overcome
the legacy of the apartheid system by restructuring the constitution, legal
system, policies and administration (Wester et al., 2003). The issuing of
licences to existing and potential new water users is an ongoing process and
licences have been introduced gradually in different parts of the country
depending on the degree of water scarcity (DWAF, 2004).
Several authors have already identified shortcomings in the new water
rights system. Backeberg (2006) describes how the short review period
(every five years) of licenses has a negative effect on farmers’ investment
decisions. This review period was adopted to allow government to take
timely measures to maintain the integrity of water resources, achieve a
balance between water supply and demand or accommodate changes in
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water use priorities (DWAF, 2004). However, the conditions attached to
licences can be changed at each review (for instance, the volume and
timing of abstractions, or the volume that may be stored) and this gives
farmers the impression that their licences are insecure (Nieuwoudt and
Armitage, 2004). The same authors also point out that the allocation is
not entirely reliable because there is no guaranteed supply; although the
licence specifies the quantities that can be abstracted, there is no guarantee
that there will be a sufficient supply to do so (Republic of South Africa, 1998;
Pott et al., 2009). This has a negative effect on the quality of the title because
the capacity of the title to adequately describe the resource is limited.
Finally, Louw and Van Schalkwyk (2002) have criticized the provisions for
transferability. Transferable water rights and water markets are generally
believed to improve water productivity by allowing the transfer of water
rights from low-value users to high-value users (Bjornlund and McKay,
2002; Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004; Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Zekri
and Easter, 2007; Brooks and Harris, 2008), although over-regulation will
reduce the efficiency gains (Rosegrant et al., 1995; Shi, 2006).
In South Africa water right transfers, which constitute a trade in water use
authorizations, are subject to the same requirements as license applications
and the water management agency has to approve every transfer. This
type of administrative procedure seems to create unnecessary transaction
costs for transfers of water rights among irrigators in the same irrigation
scheme, limiting any efficiency gains from such transfers (Pott et al., 2009).
In addition, the legislation is vague about these arrangements and the
conditions under which trade will be permitted (Perret, 2002; Backeberg,
2006). Unless the National Water Act is amended, the practice of trading
will have to further develop within the framework of common law (Pott
et al., 2009).
2.2. Design of the attribute space
One useful way of analysing rights to natural resources categorizes six
dimensions: duration, exclusivity, quality of title, flexibility, transferability
and divisibility of rights2 (FAO, 2001; Bruns, 2006). This categorization
highlights how the attributes of rights can be adjusted separately along
various dimensions, specifying rights, while implicitly leaving other
attributes of rights undefined. Challen (2000) and Crase and Dollery (2006)
have shown how this classification can be applied to water rights. To
keep our analysis within manageable proportions we choose to apply
only the dimensions that are most relevant to the present situation in
South Africa. These were chosen from a literature review (Louw and van
Schalkwyk, 2002; Nieuwoudt, 2002; Perret, 2002; Nieuwoudt and Armitage,
2 Duration is used to represent the period of the rights. Exclusivity describes the
extent to which others can be prevented from accessing the item/resource or
enjoying the benefits that flow from it. The transferability dimension encapsulates
the ease with which a right may be passed to others. Divisibility depicts the degree
to which the right can be subdivided, and flexibility defines the extent to which
the right permits an alteration to the pattern of use. Finally, the quality of title
attribute encompasses the capacity of the title to adequately describe the resource
or item (Crase and Dollery, 2006).
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Table 1. Attributes and levels used in the choice sets
Attributes Levels
Transferability Not transferablea Agency-based
transfer
Market transfer
Duration 5 yeara 10 year
Quality of title Guaranteed quantity Quantity not
guaranteeda
Price 0.06 R/m3a 0.09 R/m3 0.12 R/m3
aindicates the base level.
2004; Backeberg, 2006), which identified duration, transferability and the
quality of the title as the dimensions that were attracting the most concern.
The selected attributes and levels were also discussed with sector experts
from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and the Water Research
Commission. Table 1 provides an overview of the attributes and attribute
levels considered.
The National Water Resources Strategy Paper of South Africa (DWAF,
2004) stipulates that a water license should be re-evaluated at least every 5
years. The base level for the duration attribute was therefore set at 5 years. A
second alternative duration of 10 years was chosen: this is considered long
enough not to deter most investments, while still allowing government
to respond to changing circumstances. Three levels of transferability were
introduced in the CR experiment: no possibility to transfer, agency-based
transfer and market transfer. As explained in section 2.1, the agency-
based transfer option fits best with the current legal provisions. However,
because non-transferable water rights reflect the current situation on the
ground and because of the legal uncertainty regarding transferability, it
was considered relevant to include the option of non-transferable water
rights. The dimension of quality of title covers the adequacy of the title
in describing the resource or item. Two levels of this dimension, non-
guaranteed and guaranteed supply, were chosen for this study. Finally, to be
able to economically value attribute changes, a pricing vehicle was included.
We used the unit price of water in rand (R), (R/m3), to evaluate respondent’s
WTP for changes in the different attributes. The price attribute was set at
three levels: 0.06, 0.09 and 0.12 R/m3.3 The price of 0.06 R/m3 corresponds
to typical water prices for irrigation in the study area (DWAF, 2008a, b).
2.3. Design of the ranking sets
The full factorial design or all possible combinations of four attributes, two
with two different levels and two with three different levels, provide 36
possible water right definitions. Clearly, it would not be feasible to ask
respondents to rank 36 profiles. Consequently, it was necessary to reduce
the number of profiles by grouping them into smaller sets of four (Bennett
and Adamowicz, 2001; Alriksson and O¨berg, 2008). This was done in three
stages. In the first stage we constructed an orthogonal design, using the
3 The average exchange rate at the time of data collection was 1R = 0.13US$.
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Figure 1. Choice set example.
Notes: aIcons for the transferability attribute refer to the ‘agency-based transfer’,
‘no transfer’, ‘agency-based transfer’ and ‘market transfer’ respectively. bIcons
for quality of the title attribute refer to ‘guaranteed quantity’, ‘guaranteed
quantity’, ‘quantity not guaranteed’ and ‘quantity not guaranteed’ respectively.
Orthoplan-function in the statistical package SPSS. The construction of the
orthogonal design provided nine profiles. Then we used a design procedure
developed by Street et al. (2005) to create nine sets of 4 profiles. The interested
reader can consult their work for more information about the procedure.
Street et al. (2005) demonstrated that choice sets constructed in this
way are balanced and minimize attribute-level overlap, which allows
more information to be collected from the same sample size. These
properties mean that the technique will always yield the optimal or near-
optimal design for estimating main effects and the near-optimal design
for estimating main effects plus two-factor interaction effects. This can be
demonstrated using the Fisher information matrix.
In the final stage, following Holmes and Adamowicz (2002), it was
decided to randomly divide the choice sets into blocks to avoid ‘respondent
fatigue’. Each respondent would be randomly assigned to a particular block.
Three blocks of three choice sets were constructed. Figure 1 presents a choice
set. The attributes were graphically represented because it was expected that
part of the respondent population would be illiterate. Farmers are currently
operating under a ‘base scenario’ definition of water rights, which has the
lowest water price. Because this study is concerned with improvements to
this base scenario, we did not include a classic ‘no choice’ option in the
choice sets. This is also seen elsewhere in the literature (Blamey et al., 1999;
Foster and Mourato, 2002; Bateman et al., 2006; Hanley et al., 2006). If such
an option were to be included in the choice set, by construction one of the
other options would always be dominant, because each choice contains at
least one option where price remains at the low level and one or more of
the other attributes are improved.
2.4. Data collection
The data were collected in April 2008 in the Limpopo province of South
Africa (see figure 2). A sample of eight irrigation schemes that typified
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Figure 2. Location of Limpopo province within South Africa.
smallholder irrigation schemes in rural South Africa was identified from the
national database of small-scale irrigation schemes. This sample included
both larger irrigation schemes, with more than 100 farmers, and smaller
schemes, with 30–40 farmers. The total area covered by the schemes was
about 1,000 ha. Care was taken that the sample covered different cropping
patterns which, in turn, reflect varying degrees of water scarcity.
Contacts with the scheme managers were made through the agricultural
extension services4 responsible for the schemes. About 30% of the farmers
in these schemes were randomly selected from a list of active farmers
provided by the scheme management. A team of interviewers consisting
of post-graduate students from Limpopo University in Polokwane was
trained to conduct the interviews. The training also involved one day of
pre-testing the questionnaire. The farmers were interviewed in their fields.
Before starting the questionnaire, the interviewers explained the objective
of the study and gave information about the existing water rights system.
In a stepwise manner, the farmers were familiarised with the graphical
representation of the attribute levels in the CR experiment. In addition to
the CR experiment the questionnaires also asked for detailed information
regarding farming activities, alternative income sources and institutional
aspects of water management. On average, the interviews took about 45
min. In total 134 questionnaires were completed, which provided 402 choice
sets for analysis.
4 This is a governmental service providing training and technical advice to farmers.
In practice, an extension officer is responsible for providing assistance to the
farmers of all the irrigation schemes in his sector.
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2.5. Analytical framework
The econometric analysis of data collected from a CR experiment is based
on McFadden’s conditional logit model, which is grounded in the random
utility framework (McFadden, 1974). The indirect utility function Uij is
decomposed into two parts:
Uij = b(Xij, Zi ) + eij. (1)
The first is an observable element b(Xij, Zi) which describes the
preferences of respondent i as a function of the attributes of the alternatives
presented to the individual Xij and the characteristics of the individuals Zi.
The second is a stochastic element eij, which represents those influences on
individual choice that cannot be observed by the researcher.
Typically, it is assumed that the eij are independently and identically
distributed with an extreme value (Weibull) distribution, resulting in a
conditional logit model. However, a conditional logit model only allows
the identification of the most preferred alternative and thus does not fully
utilize all the information contained in a CR experiment. Beggs et al. (1981)
developed an extension to the basic conditional logit model, known as the
rank-ordered logit model. This is capable not only of identifying the most
preferred alternative but also the exact ordinal ranking of all the remaining
elements. In the model, the probability of obtaining a particular ranking
can be expressed as (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999)
P(Ui1 > Ui2 . . . > Uij) =
J∏
j=1
exp(bXij)
∑J
k= j exp(bXik)
. (2)
Once the parameter estimates of this model have been obtained, a WTP
can be derived for each attribute (Hanley et al., 1998, 2001). When it is
assumed that utility is a linear function of the attribute levels, as in (1),
WTP can simply be expressed as
WTP = −bc
by
, (3)
in which by is the coefficient of the cost attribute and bc is the coefficient of
any of the other attributes. Equation (3) therefore expresses the marginal
rate of substitution between the price attribute and the other attribute in
the equation and provides what is technically known as the implicit price.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Characteristics of the sample population
Some selected characteristics of the sample population are presented in
table 2. The average age of the farmers in the sample was 58 years, they had
an average of 5.6 years of schooling and the average plot size was 1.2 ha.
These figures are typical for this population as a whole (Perret, 2002; Van
Averbeke and Mohammed, 2006; Hope et al., 2008). The schemes in the
sample are surface irrigated, which is the prevailing method on South
African smallholder schemes. In the drier regions of Limpopo most farmers
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Table 2. Selected sample population characteristics
Mean (standard deviation) Range
Farmers’ age (years) 57.8 (13.2) 27–85
Adult education (years) 5.6 (4.5) 0–15
Irrigated plot size (ha) 1.2 (0.4) 0.4–4
Income share from irrigation (%) 29 (24) 1–100
Commercialisation (%) 38 (30) 0–100
only cultivate the irrigated land during the wet summer season, and maize
is the most important crop. In other parts of the province production is
more diversified: the majority of the farmers produce maize in summer and
a wide variety of crops in winter. Spinach, beans, beetroots, cabbages and
tomatoes were the most important winter crops among this sample.
For most of the households in the sample, cropping is not their main
source of income. As in most rural areas of South Africa, pensions and child
allowances are the most important income sources (Perret et al., 2003; Hope
et al., 2008). The income share from irrigated farming among the farmers
was highly variable, ranging between 1% and 100% with an average of
29%. Higher dependency on income from irrigated farming was generally
associated with a lower overall income level, as it generally reflected an
absence of other income sources. Most production is subsistence-oriented.
The average degree of commercialisation, calculated as the value share of
production that is marketed, was 38%.
From the survey it is apparent that water shortages at irrigation schemes
in Limpopo province mainly manifest themselves in reductions in the area
cultivated during the dry season. In the winter season, 37% of the farmers
reduce their cultivated area and about the same proportion of farmers
stop production. This study also monitored respondents’ level of trust in
water management institutions. Farmers were asked to indicate on a 5 point
Likert scale how much confidence they had in three different levels of water
institutions. These scores were then averaged. Nearly 36% of the farmers
had low confidence in the functioning of the water management institutions
(average score of less than 1.7), 31% claimed to have a lot of confidence
(average score of more than 3.3), and trust levels for the remaining 34%
were somewhere in between.
3.2. Rank-ordered logit results
The results of the rank-ordered logit models were obtained using the
statistical package STATA version 9. Following the recommendations of
Holmes and Adamowicz (2002), qualitative attributes were effect-coded.
When using effect-coding, the base level is assigned code −1. For the quality
of title dimension, ‘non-guaranteed supply’ was the base level while for the
transferability, the base level was ‘no possibility to transfer’. In effect-coding
the utility of the base level of a variable equals the negative of the sum of
the coefficients for the other levels of that variable, while the utility of the
other levels corresponds to their coefficient. A Hausman specification test
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Table 3. Rank-ordered logit model results (full sample n = 134)
Attributes
Coefficient
(standard errors) Odds ratios
% change
in odds
Duration 0.096a (0.014) 1.100 10
Quality of title 0.628a (0.038) 1.875 87.5
Agency-based transfer 0.230a (0.050) 1.259 25.9
Market transfer 0.360a (0.051) 1.433 43.3
Price −0.048a (0.015) 0.953 −4.7
Model Fitb
Pseudo R2 0.177
Likelihood ratio (LR) 452.217a
asignificant at 0.01.
bThe Pseudo R2 reported here and in the following tables is also known
as Mc Fadden rho square.
was performed for all models to test the assumption of independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), a specific assumption, which always has to
be tested for this type of models. The data supported this assumption for
all models. Table 3 presents the rank-ordered logit estimates for the full
sample. Interaction effects were tested, but none of them were retained in
the model as their coefficients were not significant.
All the coefficients in the main effects model significantly differ from zero
at a 99% significance level, meaning that they all are significant determinants
of choice. The signs of the attribute parameters are as expected. Guarantee
of water supply, increased duration of the licence, and improvements in
transferability all increased the probability of an option being chosen.
Conversely, a higher water price decreased this probability. This is also
reflected in the odds ratios and the derived percentage change in odds,
which reflect the difference in probability of choosing a particular option
when the attribute changes. For most respondents, guaranteed supply and
market transfer were most important.
In a second step the population was stratified in three ways: first
according to the level of water shortage experienced by the farmers,
second according to the overall income share derived from irrigated
production, and finally according to their level of trust in the water
management institutions. The model’s results for these different segments
of the population are presented in tables 4–6.
Likelihood ratio tests confirmed that the parameter estimates are
not identical for the different segments. Table 4 compares results for
respondents who experienced severe water shortages (and reduced the
area they cultivate in the dry season by more than 25%) and respondents
who did not experience water shortages (no reduction in cultivated area).
Results for the remaining group of farmers are not reported because the
sample (n = 16) was too small to yield reliable results. The probability of
choosing a water right option with an assured water supply was clearly
much higher among farmers experiencing water shortages than those who
do not experience shortages. In addition farmers experiencing shortages
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Table 4. Rank-ordered logit model results for segments with different levels of water
shortage
No water shortage (n = 36) Water shortage (n = 82)
Attributes
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
%
change
odds
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
%
change
odds
Duration 0.093a (0.026) 1.097 9.7 0.092a (0.018) 1.097 9.7
Quality of title 0.499a (0.070) 1.647 64.7 0.672a (0.050) 1.959 95.9
Agency-based
transfer
0.301a (0.095) 1.352 35.2 0.247a (0.064) 1.280 28.0
Market-based
transfer
0.210b (0.095) 1.233 23.3 0.471a (0.067) 1.602 60.2
Price −0.054b (0.028) 0.947 −5.3 −0.052a (0.019) 0.950 −5.0
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.202
LR 93.324a 315.950a
asignificant at 0.01; bsignificant at 0.05.
show a stronger preference for market transfer, probably because they see
this as a potential way of ensuring access to water supply (Pott et al., 2009).
Bjornlund (2006), Calatrava and Garrido (2005) and Hadjigeorgalis (2008)
have also described the role that water markets could play in addressing
supply risk in regions with fluctuating supply.
Table 5 illustrates the importance of institutional trust. For farmers with
low institutional trust mainly the quality of the title is important, while
introduction of agency-based transfer hardly increases the odds. Farmers
with a high level of institutional trust consider a system with agency-
based transfer to be as important as the quality of the title. Thus, any
change in the transferability of water rights would appear to first require
an improvement in the levels of trust in the water institutions to be
successful. As long as levels of trust are low, people will not value increased
transferability and therefore improvements in efficiency or cost recovery
will not be fully exploited. Communication is an important aspect here; at
present farmers have a low awareness about how the water management
institutions work and what their responsibilities are. This issue was also
raised in earlier studies by Wester et al. (2003), Waalewijn et al. (2005)
and Orne-Gliemann (2008). The smallholders’ unfamiliarity with the water
management institutions might explain their current low level of trust in
these institutions.
Table 6 shows the impact of the income contribution of irrigation on the
preferences of farmers. It compares farmers for whom irrigation makes a
small income contribution (<20%) with those for whom it makes a high
contribution (>35%). If the income from irrigation constitutes only a small
part of the total family income, then a unit price increase only has a minor
impact on the odds of choosing an option. When irrigation is responsible
for 35% or more of the family income, the disutility of a unit price increase
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Table 5. Rank-ordered logit model results for segments with different institutional trust levels
Low trust (n = 48) Medium trust (n = 45) High trust (n = 41)
Attributes
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
% change
odds
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
% change
odds
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
% change
odds
Duration 0.093a (0.023) 1.098 9.8 0.088a (0.023) 1.087 8.7 0.105a (0.025) 1.110 11
Quality 0.798a (0.069) 2.221 122.1 0.628a (0.065) 1.875 87.5 0.479a (0.068) 1.615 61.5
Agency-based transfer 0.046 (0.084) 1.047 4.7 0.236a (0.087) 1.267 26.7 0.481a (0.092) 1.618 61.8
Market-based transfer 0.252a (0.089) 1.286 28.7 0.392a (0.086) 1.480 48.0 0.458a (0.097) 1.581 58.0
Price −0.084a (0.025) 0.920 −8 −0.028 (0.026) 0.973 −2.7 −0.028 (0.027) 0.972 −2.8
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.210 0.186 0.190
LR 192.610a 159.355a 148.406a
asignificant at 0.01.
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Table 6. Rank-ordered logit model results for segments with different reliance on
irrigation for their income
Low-income contribution
(n = 63)
High-income contribution
(n = 40)
Attributes
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
%
change
odds
Coefficient
(standard errors)
Odds
ratio
%
change
odds
Duration 0.116a (0.020) 1.123 12.3 0.094a (0.025) 1.098 9.8
Quality of title 0.575a (0.055) 1.778 77.8 0.793a (0.076) 2.210 121
Agency-based
transfer
0.172a (0.072) 1.188 18.8 0.201b (0.093) 1.223 22.3
Market transfer 0.410a (0.076) 1.507 50.7 0.355a (0.099) 1.426 42.6
Price −0.036c (0.022) 0.965 −3.5 −0.121a (0.028) 0.886 −11.4
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.165 0.237
LR 198.682a 180.929a
asignificant at 0.01; bsignificant at 0.05; csignificant at the 0.1.
is about three times larger. As all the farmers in the sample have similar
sized plots, a larger income share from irrigation is usually associated with
a lower and less diversified total income. This could clearly be seen in the
dataset and is in accordance with findings for other smallholder schemes
(see Perret et al., 2003; Yokwe, 2009). For farmers who are more financially
dependent on irrigation, the quality of the title is much more important
since their income is more affected by insufficient supply.
One of the main objectives of this study was to obtain the implicit values
of marginal attribute changes. Figure 3, based on (3), presents the estimates
of the implicit prices derived for the entire sample and for different strata.
The results for the full sample indicate that the average farmer highly values
securing supply (WTP of 0.12 R/m3) and the opportunity for agency-based
transfer (WTP of 0.14 R/m3 for a shift from not transferable to agency-based
transfer). Compared to a system of agency-based transfer, the establishment
of water markets does not seem to add much value, yielding an additional
WTP of just 0.02 R/m2.
The impact of smallholder characteristics on their WTP can be assessed
by comparing the WTP for different segments of the sample. This analysis
shows that respondents in the different segments have quite different WTP
for the attribute changes. Farmers experiencing water shortages are willing
to pay more for a secure supply than those not experiencing shortages
(0.13 R/m3 compared to 0.09 R/m3) and also to pay more for improved
transferability of water rights. Figure 3 shows that this applies to both
transferability levels (agency- and market-based). This finding could, again,
be taken as indicative that these farmers see transferability as an option for
assuring a secure water supply in periods of drought. It is evident that
the WTP of farmers with low levels of institutional trust is lower for all
attribute changes than for those with medium or high institutional trust.
The difference is particularly marked when evaluating a change from no
use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X10000161
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 22 Dec 2016 at 23:33:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
478 S. Speelman et al.
Figure 3. Implicit values of attributes changes for different segments.
transfer to agency-based transfer, an option for which farmers with low
institutional trust are only willing to pay 0.04 R/m3, compared to 0.31 R/m3
and 0.50 R/m3 for those with medium and high trust, respectively. It is also
of interest that when institutional trust is high, agency-based transfer is
preferred to market transfer (very small negative WTP to go from agency-
based transfer to market transfer).
Overall the analysis makes it clear that trust in institutions is a very
important determining factor when it comes to evaluating property rights.
Another finding is that the WTP of poorer farmers (who depend more
on irrigation) is lower for all attribute changes. This may well reflect the
limited capacity of these poorer farmers to pay for water, a problem already
identified by Backeberg (2006) and Perret and Geyser (2007). This implies
that pursuit of the cost recovery objective needs also to pay close attention
to increasing the productivity and thus the income of these farmers.
4. Conclusions
As competition for water grows and supplies come under more strain, water
users and water management organizations are seeking better institutional
arrangements for coordinating use and resolving conflicts. Improving water
rights is one option for increasing water productivity, increasing the benefits
from existing and new investments in water supplies, and enhancing rural
livelihoods. In this way improvements in water rights can help to reduce
poverty (Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya, 2005).
This study demonstrates how CR can be used to measure the benefits
from improving different dimensions of water rights among smallholder
irrigators in South Africa. While such farmers have a potential to contribute
to poverty reduction in rural areas, they clearly struggle with problems
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of low water use efficiency and insufficient cost recovery of government
investments (Speelman et al., 2008b). In this context it is pertinent to evaluate
the expected impact of water rights reforms on this stakeholder group.
The results of the rank-ordered logit model using the full sample indicate
that improved water rights can bring significant economic benefits to
smallholders. They highly value the possibility to transfer such rights
and receive an assured supply. However these overall results mask large
differences between different segments of the farming population. Farmers
experiencing water shortage have a higher WTP for a secure supply and for
improved transferability of water rights. As indicated by Pott et al. (2009),
these farmers see improvements in the water rights system as a potential
solution for their water shortage problem. Calatrava and Garrido (2005)
studied an irrigation district in Southern Spain, under similar climatic
conditions, and demonstrated that water markets can play an important
role in countering supply risks.
Our analysis of institutional trust indicates that trust in the institutions
is necessary to fully value water rights improvements. This implies that,
from a cost recovery perspective, it is important for the government
to increase the level of trust of small-scale farmers in the water
management institutions, since this will increase their WTP for the proposed
interventions in the water rights.
Finally, the poorer farmers in the sample, who are more dependent on
irrigation for their income, experience a significantly stronger disutility
of water price increases, which limits their WTP for water rights
improvements. This again highlights the importance of continuing effort
from government departments and the research community to help
smallholder irrigators in South Africa to increase their productivity and
income (Backeberg, 2006).
While the results presented in this paper offer valuable insights to policy
makers to guide water right reforms, the approach also has its limitations.
The type of analysis provided here should be part of a broader framework
that also weighs the costs of the interventions against the benefits. Some
reforms, such as an increase in the licence review period, might lower
costs, while others will have a price tag attached to them. Furthermore, in a
country such as South Africa where equity is a prime concern, it is important
to consider the distributional effects on all stakeholders. Intersectoral water
markets for example might cause water re-allocation from agriculture
to non-agricultural uses, with negative effects for smallholder irrigators.
Further research is required to add to our knowledge of what the effect of
water rights interventions is on different stakeholders and the costs of these
interventions.
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